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Class, violence and 
citizenship in the 
Arab uprisings: 
assessing deeper 
forms of transition
I. Reading the Arab ‘transitions’  
on two levels
It is far from clear whether sound, detailed and 
comparative literature applying the paradigm of 
transitology to Arab countries will emerge in the 
near future because of the widespread tenden-
cy to consider Arab politics an outlier or to be 
so trapped in its particularities that internation-
al comparison is impossible. The year 2011 and 
the wave of Arab uprisings1 have injected a new 
life in the field of transition studies. There was a 
real moment of initial euphoria: the hopes to see 
age-long autocracies being shelved for good 
was combined with the possible end of the dom-
inant Orientalist depictions, that is an essential-
ist and eurocentric way of depicting Arab Middle 
Eastern societies as culturally hostile to democ-
racy.2 A year into the uprisings and the return 
role played by the military in countries such as 
Egypt, or Yemen, not to mention the tragic de-
scent of Syria into an all-out civil war, applying 
the question of transition to the Arab cases was 
rapidly seen as a non sequitur and, thus, enthu-
siasm subsided. Many, since then, have spoken 
in hasty and definitive terms of the “failure” of 
the revolutionary experiment or of democrat-
ic transition. Others evoked the transformation 
of an “Arab spring” into a sour Arab winter. Old 
Orientalist types of assertions linking, in a sim-
plistic way, the rise of Islamic factions to power 
to an automatic failure of democratisation have 
regained territory, obfuscating the deeper and 
historical origins of violence that have marred 
so many countries originally shaken by the 2011 
popular revolts. 
As always with a discussion of “transition”, the 
risk is to assume a more or less explicit mod-
el, combined with the risk of teleological thinking. 
Benoît Challand
New School for Social Research, New York
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:44:48 |
Class, violence and citizenship in the Arab uprisings
84
After a glorious period of transition studies, ushered in the late 1980s by the field’s so-called “green 
book”,3 transitology turned into a number-crunching enterprise in the late 1990s, reinforcing the view 
that there exists a telos through which processes of economic and political liberalisation could be 
geared, and whose progress could be measured. It was also often believed that these processes 
could be engineered and steered through prescriptive policies. Transitology, despite Carothers’ clas-
sical critique of a teleological fallacy underpinning many studies,4 became a cottage industry versed 
in quantitative methods and prone to speaking the language of policy recommendations. This came, 
I believe, at the expense of a deeper historical knowledge of the contexts in which transitions could 
be seen as having appeared. Such type of studies would also overlook subtle, qualitative aspects of 
politics, which this article would like to address, in particular around new, bottom–up political claims 
and reformulations for a more egalitarian and just sense of citizenship.5 These are issues that often 
slip under the radar of transition literature, both in general (with a focus on elite-driven pacts) or in 
the Middle East (with the dominant concern of (semi-)authoritarian resilience).
While contextualised qualitative and historical knowledge is needed to grasp the drive towards 
democratisation in select Arab countries, any comparative study runs the risk of engaging in sim-
plification. This article thus concentrates mostly on two countries, Egypt and Tunisia, but references 
in passing will also be made to other countries to illustrate that the tendencies in these two coun-
tries can also be identified elsewhere.6 This does not mean that definitive claims are made about, 
say, Tunisian, Yemeni, Egyptian or Bahraini societies and politics being identical, or to essentialise 
politics or “culture” here or there. But if traces of generalisation remain in these lines, these are 
the normal epistemological consequence of the “crosscultural cognisance”7 inherent in the schol-
arly research called transition. The fact that scholars can now include in their “transitology dataset” 
material from the Arab worlds is a rare opportunity for social research. Despite all its problematic 
limitations, “transitology” can and should be applied to Arab countries.8
A couple of transitologist analyses have linked this reading grid with the Arab uprisings. Among 
them, Ould Mohamedou and Sisk have done an important job by laying the ground for an applica-
tion of transitology to the political dynamics that followed the 2011 Arab uprisings.9 They warn us 
of the widespread tendency to see transitions as “short-term political developments” or as limited 
“periods between the fall of the dictator and a free (or merely) trouble-free election”.10 They invite us 
never to forget that democracy (the direction in which countries with contested autocratic regimes, 
such as those put under pressure in almost all Arab countries since 2011, have been, at least, orig-
inally moving) is a highly contingent and incremental outcome.11 It is therefore illusory to assess 
in a yes-or-no question whether Arab transitions have been successful or not, or to expect that a 
revolution leads automatically to democracy. Brumberg offers another welcome contribution to 
these debates by making transitologists attentive to the interplay of what he calls “protection rack-
et autocracies” and identity conflicts, issues that have plagued postindependence Arab politics.12
In this article I would like to take their warnings a step further to argue that the Arab uprisings need not 
(only) be assessed solely against the backdrop of institutional changes (elections, writing of new consti-
tutions, the emergence of party systems, etc.). Instead we need to consider the revolts as a set of histori-
cal events that share, beyond the differences that such disparate countries as Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain 
or Egypt can offer, a common aspiration towards a renewed and reactivated sense of citizenship from 
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below, that is, from spontaneous forms of civil society, in conjunction with innervated trade union move-
ments, and the emergence of new informal class coalitions13 pushing for more participatory politics. 
Elsewhere, I have offered a detailed reading why it was not civil society that we had expected to be 
active in the streets of Cairo, Tunis or Sanaa.14 Years of “civil society promotion” since the 1990s had 
done some harm (in terms of mass mobilisation) because of the trends towards professionalisation 
witnessed in this sector, with some Arab NGOs becoming isolated and more interested in their own 
institutional survival than in constantly expanding or renewing their links with local constituencies.15 
Some NGOs might have played a role in the revolts of 2011, but the vast strength of these popular 
revolts stemmed from a powerful sense of convergence of people of different generational and ge-
ographic origins, and from various, often unstructured groups that made demands for immediate 
changes by erecting symbolic encampments in strategic locations. By being physically present and 
refusing vague promises for future changes, they signalled a novelty of these revolts, what I have 
termed presentism, namely the expectation that people could improve their political present.16 This 
presentist coming together, or intersectionality, of different classes, generations, sexes and/or so-
cial groupings, shouldered the complex dynamics that allowed for the toppling of autocratic leaders. 
Counterrevolutionary forces have managed to undercut these trends by preventing this intersec-
tionality, and the force of presentism in particular, by returning to the use of violence to justify au-
tocratic forms of power, such as those witnessed in Egypt with the new president, Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi. These are the more recent phases of the revolts: typically the beginning of military con-
frontation in Syria in the fall 2011 or the collapse of President Hadi’s government in the face of the 
Houthi campaign in late summer 2014. In these moments, we have seen groups (typically military 
groups) shut the door on forms of negotiation when threatened by popular revolts and their rad-
ical demands. These shared dynamics towards calls for opening (presentism, the call for a more 
inclusive and just sense of citizenship) and subsequent counterrevolutionary dynamics have led 
us to consider class convergence but also the place of violence as essential ingredients to under-
standing deeper forms of transitions.
The legacies of the Arab uprisings can be read on two levels, which overlap with two distinct sen-
sitivities or approaches in transition studies. In a deep way, the uprisings have signified a demand 
for a profound renegotiation of each national social contract, new forms of representation and in-
creased control by the sovereign power of the people over the means of violence. These demands, 
which give grounding to the first type of “sensitivity” in apprehending “transitions”, were aired in the 
initial phase of the revolts in all Arab countries, and constituted a remarkable novelty.17 The second 
level of reading concentrates on a more formal level of representation (through elections, adoption 
of new constitutions) and through the sustained existence of formal channels of collective deci-
sion-making and the respect for pluralist exchanges. Once these channels of formal negotiations 
collapsed, it has been tempting for outside observers to say that the “game of transition” was over. 
Transitions are not only about these formal institutional changes (the second level). They are also 
about gradual and imperfect processes through which citizenship, forms of representations and 
the use of violence have been renegotiated (the first level). I believe that any talk of “Arab transi-
tions” must take this qualitative novelty into consideration. The historical moments that started in 
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2011 have been about the (re-)affirmation of the sovereign power of the demos to redefine, radi-
cally, political representation in the Arab worlds.18 These were such startling innovations that their 
substance did not go unnoticed in the rest of the world, with many occupy or indignados move-
ments popping up in the wake of the Arab revolts. 
In order to give a “name” to this radical novelty, I propose rethinking the core of the uprisings as an 
attempt to rethink the notion of representation. Representation here will be declined around two 
subthemes. The first one deals with the issue of social class: have the middle classes, often con-
sidered to be “underlying drivers” of political change,19 played a central role in the unfolding of the 
Arab transitions? The second dimension of political representation deals with the attempt towards 
a redomestication of political violence and its reappropriation by the people. How have the revolts 
confronted the illegitimate use of violence by their own police and military apparatus? How is the 
notion of violence connected to a struggle to enhance citizenship in the Arab worlds?
This bringing together of class, violence and representation can be easily justified and will appear 
normal for students of the region. The first gesture of the Arab uprisings was, indeed, to question the 
modern logics of representation by saying that we, the people, and not the (elected) representatives, 
are the sovereign power.20 All the Arab revolts expressed the capacity through physical proximity to 
renegotiate the meaning of citizenship and a new shared sense of political subjectivity which was in-
timately connected to the control of violence.21 Indeed, the Arab Middle East is a region with a long 
history of violence and military confrontations – many of which have international roots.22 This fact, 
combined with a longer colonial presence,23 resulted in an enormous degree of external interference: 
the so-called peace architecture around Israel, Egypt, Palestine and Jordan generated a cascade of 
concern for “security” in the region, and the aftermath of the support for the Afghan mujahideen in the 
1980s is still perceived, with many jihadi groups having returned to their place of origin. 
As a result, military encroachments limit the sovereign exercise of politics, and increase the high 
political profile presented by external rents such as foreign aid, military aid or debt forgiveness. The 
difficulty is to disentangle the degree to which external factors hinder or shoulder internal process 
of social and political change. Heydemann and Bermeo both illustrate different consequences of 
this high degree of military preparedness in the Arab Middle East, but they concur in their conclu-
sions that violence has been mostly in the hands of isolated regime leaders who rarely hesitated 
to use military violence against their own population to defend their power.24 Such a mixture of ex-
ternal meddling and truncated domestic processes has left traces, I would like to argue, and yield-
ed, up to 2011, an anaemic form of citizenship. The revolts of 2011, and their call for the respect for 
human dignity and more social justice, gave an impetus to reshuffle class politics and to question 
the illegitimate use of violence by state authorities and ruling regimes. 
II. Representation and the role of class
In general, students of revolutions and democratic transitions all face the thorny question of what 
specific role class plays in the reshaping of political and social systems at critical junctures. Often 
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the middle class is seen as a necessary stepping stone on which new alliances – pacts – are forged, 
and thus becomes an essential “ingredient” for political change.
For the Arab worlds, I think it is misleading to ask this question and to posit a role for a given class 
within the clear realm of national borders, for at least three reasons. 
First, after two decades of neoliberal policies, the very notion of middle class can be called into 
question, because of processes of internal fragmentation. Some subgroups have benefited from 
intense liberalisation while others have been marginalised.25 This process is most visible in Egypt, 
where the emergence of the so-called “business government”, led by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif 
from 2004 to 2011, generated a split inside what became a two-speed middle class, one subpart 
being faster in reaping the benefits of liberalisation than the other, typically civil servants whose 
status was gradually eroded.26 Second, it is difficult to identify a clear and identical role for the mid-
dle class in complex events such as those of the Arab uprisings. Third, the transnational ramifi-
cations of class formation are so significant in the Arab Middle East that it becomes impossible to 
locate or pin down a clear role for the middle class within domestic borders. One is forced instead 
to adopt a larger, regional and international focus to understand how and which classes are differ-
ently involved in these moments of upheaval. 
The specificities of Arab political and economic systems force us thus to transcend any narrow 
methodological nationalism when studying class differentiations.27 I will therefore divide this sec-
tion into two sets of argument: the first questioning normative expectations around the existence 
of a “middle class”, and the second pointing to external factors such as rent-seeking behaviour28 
and the existence of a transnational bourgeoisie whose span of action and influence is not limited 
to domestic borders. After a decade or so of muted discussions on class, it is high time to revivify 
themes of class analyses, which were central in the early work on transition.29 Let us discuss some 
normative views accompanying discourses on the middle class.
a) Why focusing on ‘the middle class’ is misleading
There are many interpretations of the role class plays in preparing and making revolutions possi-
ble. The danger is to selectively examine moments when the middle class appears as a key com-
ponent in leading political change. One could, however, select other episodes of such rebellions 
that shed a less favourable light on the middle class. With regard to the Arab uprisings of 2011, 
some of these analyses force parallels with European history and try to defend the view that the 
middle class has been a motor of the Arab Spring. If by this we mean to assess whether the mid-
dle class was a trigger and essential component of the wave of protests, it is hard to argue against 
such a view. Revolutions have by and large been bourgeois events – and the original moment of 
the Arab uprisings fits this pattern, with vast sections of the middle class (though not only) in the 
early months of 2011 taking to the streets for their first time – from Sanaa to Tunis, and from Cai-
ro to Manama, and bandwagoning on activism and grievances relayed originally by lower work-
ing classes and/or marginalised groups.30 Indeed, even in Bahrain, where the revolution is usually 
described in the simplistic terms of a Shiite–Sunni divide, the initial protest included not just the 
disgruntled local Shiite population, but also segments of the Sunni middle class as well as organ-
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ised labour.31 Without the support of (at least) portions of the liberal professions and middle class, 
no revolution is likely to occur – and this has been the case in all Arab countries in 2011, when the 
tipping points in these protests were reached when richer neighbourhoods or cities threw in their 
support and joined the bulk of the protest movements. 
If, however, we are asking whether the middle class has supported a continuous effort towards 
more social justice and structural change in the pattern of economic and political redistribution, 
it is obvious that the middle class has not at all been a motor of the Arab uprisings. Two series of 
episodes can substantiate this claim. On the one hand, a look at the role of lower classes in these 
revolts shows the complex and overlapping composition of political activism. On the other, events 
like those in Egypt during the summer of 2013 cast doubt on the automatically positive expectation 
(in terms of transition and democratisation) that is often attached to the middle class.
In the first series, it is obvious that the marginalised and lower classes are the ones willing to ex-
ert political pressure to keep the motor of the Arab uprisings going, so to say. Contrary to studies 
that look at elite-driven pacts or “transitions”, one needs to shed light on lower-class activism. Ex-
amples from different Arab countries can illustrate this. 
In Tunisia, youth and marginalised Tunisians were pivotal in contributing to the second phase of 
protest, after President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country on 14 January 2011. This new wave, 
called the second Qasbah protests, took place in February and March 2011. These new sit-ins in 
the old city (qasbah in Arabic) and near key ministries maintained pressure on the transitional gov-
ernment and raised public awareness among the population at large on the need to keep the train 
of reforms moving. It is widely accepted that these manifestations paved the way for a collective 
agreement and compromises on how the autumn elections would be held.32 Again in 2013, when 
the Tunisian parliament stalled in delivering a new constitution, an alliance of trade union activists, 
the national bar association and industrialists forced the ruling troika to step down and hastened 
the enactment of a new constitution in January 2014.33 
In Yemen, one could see disenfranchised groups in the north such as akhdam (lower caste servants) 
and excluded sectors in the south pushing for the realisation of a similar national dialogue after the 
departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011.34 Similarly, it was youth activists from different so-
cial backgrounds who in March 2011 began calling for an end to political divisions in Palestine. At the 
end of 2011 in Egypt, when it became clear that the police state was still pulling the strings even af-
ter the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, the November street battles – such as those of Muhammad 
Mahmoud street – belonged to the lower segments of Egyptian society, not the twitterati that were so 
central to the January and February 2011 protests.35 Alliances have surely been formed, but not just 
between incumbent elites and the middle classes: shared pressures between the lower and middle 
classes also need to be included in our comparative analyses of the Arab uprisings.36
The second series of episodes that casts a less positive light on the involvement of the middle class 
stems from the end of President Mohamed Morsi’s power tenure in summer 2013 and post-Ra-
bia al-Adawiyya37 events. Around that time, some argued that both the military and Morsi (with the 
Muslim Brotherhood-led Freedom and Justice Party) tried to court the middle classes to forge al-
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liances.38 But this depiction deprives the middle class of its agency and turns this vast social group 
into a monolith and a simple passive weight that both sides have tried to pull onto their side of the 
balance. Let us not forget that some sizable portions of the middle class, in particular its “liberal” 
segments (precisely the segment that in mainstream democratisation theories is supposed to lead 
in the undermining of the bases of autocratic systems), took an antiliberal stance in supporting the 
military crackdown of August 2013. Supporting emergency measures and the massive curtailment 
of civil rights (freedom of expression, indiscriminate detention of Muslim Brotherhood members, 
and, since March 2014, the courts issuing a string of collective death sentences), as has been the 
case in Egypt in the past year, is not likely to hasten reform towards more social justice and dem-
ocratic transition. To be fair, the same charge of noninclusion can be levelled at the Muslim Brother-
hood’s neoliberal middle class, which neither pushed for more economic enfranchisement nor for 
more social justice while Morsi was in power.
Emerging from these short discussions is the view that middle-class involvement in these upris-
ings presents a mixed balance sheet, with positive contributions to a revolutionary transformation 
and democratic transition (by supporting the initial protests) but also negative ones (by refraining 
to transcend their own interests and to accept to abandon their cosy and good life, to take Lisa 
Wedeen’s expression explaining the reluctance of the Syrian urban bourgeoisie to embrace calls 
to topple Bashar al-Assad).39
b) Why the focus on the domestic features of class formation is misleading
Let us now turn to the second part of the argument on class, namely the existence of external fac-
tors and the need to avoid the traps of only employing domestic analyses. Of interest here is the 
existence of variegated forms of external rents40 (mostly foreign aid) and the existence of a trans-
national bourgeoisie in the process of making clearly identifiable social classes. All this contributes 
to the making of quite a historically unique configuration in the Arab Middle East.
To understand this specificity and avoid essentialist narratives of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, a 
historical reading of class formation in the region is necessary.41 A look at the social history of the 
Arab Middle East demonstrates that the making of the middle class has not been connected with 
the development of industrial production or to tax enfranchisement, as was the case in Europe. In-
stead, it has been mostly based on rent economics, where the economic is dependent on nontax 
revenues, the latest manifestation of which is the rent derived from foreign aid and linked to a life-
style geared by the spread of microcredit towards individual consumption and with little consider-
ation for questions of long-term sustainability. Wedeen and Ouiassa are thus absolutely correct in 
maintaining that the Arab middle classes have not been able to develop any meaningful instrument 
to push for structural changes in the 2011 uprisings, and thus their engagement with these upris-
ings has been motivated by a worldview that is based on this individualistic lifestyle.42 This inertia 
also explains the resilience of an organised clientele around the ruling classes.43
But one also needs to insist on a recent externalist explanation of the rather superficial involvement 
of the middle class in the follow-up to the revolts. The focus of many of the approaches in political 
science and sociology on the subject tends to reinforce a bias towards methodological nationalism – 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:44:48 |
Class, violence and citizenship in the Arab uprisings
90
that is, the a priori selection of variables relating uniquely to internal political or sociological process-
es. For example, if the bourgeoisie (be it Khosrokhavar’s “would-be middle class” or Bayat’s “middle 
class poor”)44 is described as defective, this is due to the nature of the political system (autocracy), or 
to internal divisions created by political Islam. In other words, all these accounts privilege internalist 
processes or domestic understandings of political change. What these explanations fail to recognise 
is that the process of class formation is connected as much to external as to internal factors. Halperin 
noted long ago45 that the systematic crushing of left-radical groups during the Cold War led to massive 
out-migration of the middle class, skewing the balance between different classes and thwarting the 
emergence of vivid class consciousness (a key ingredient of class participation in political processes).
It is here that an analysis of the middle class needs to engage with regional and international influ-
ences. If rent-seeking is generally associated with oil, one needs to look not only at the rent pro-
vided by international aid (Egypt, Palestine and Jordan have received vast amounts, both from the 
USA and EU) but also at the increasing flow of Gulf capital into countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and 
Palestine. Hanieh has powerfully demonstrated that the traditional divisions of state versus socie-
ty – or a vision of class formation limited to national borders – fail to capture the vivid and massive 
influence that transnational nonstate actors (for example, global capitalist classes)46 play in shap-
ing the future of Arab politics. 
Instances of such global or regional capitalist groups interfering from afar are many. They can be 
identified in sectors as diverse as agriculture, industry and financial services. Egyptian agriculture 
has evolved so dramatically that the period of very small farmers is almost a thing of the past.47 In-
stead we now have large agribusiness concerns whose capital comes from Gulf capitalist groups. 
Kuwaiti or Saudi capitalist investors, in league with the military, the largest single land developer in 
Egypt, have shaped the future of agriculture in Egypt. Similar conclusions can be reached in Tunisia. 
Furthermore, Isaac has identified the interest of the United Arab Emirates, the largest single donor in 
terms of foreign direct investment, in supporting certain actors in Egypt.48 Such transnational capitalist 
influence helps us better understand the fluctuations in foreign aid towards a country like Egypt that is 
at the heart of the Arab revolts. The pulling of the plug on the Muslim Brotherhood in the summer of 
2013 by some of the capitalist Gulf class can be read as a fear on the part of Saudi or Emirati investors 
of losing control over their assets and joint investments with the Egyptian military. Hanieh uses a fe-
licitous description for this intermingling of class formation, the high degree of Gulf capitalists’ invest-
ments in other Arab countries, as “the Gulf bourgeoisie” becoming “an internal bourgeoisie” in Egypt.49
We have now a transnational bourgeoisie playing a political (conservative) role that is often not 
given the attention it deserves. Be it in Palestine with President Mahmoud Abbas and some of his 
network who made their fortune in the Gulf;50 be it in Libya with former interim Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Jibril whose connections in Kuwait, Lebanon and Qatar helped him become a key fig-
ure in the early Libyan transition;51 or anti-Brotherhood sentiments expressed by the chequebook 
diplomacy of the Saudi royal family or the United Arab Emirates, one can see that not only do state 
rents shape and undermine the prospect of more democratic change in the region; but also that a 
powerful capitalist class, international in its composition and outlook, is failing the genuinely pop-
ular aspiration of the Arab uprisings for political change and economic reform in order to preserve 
its own interests and investments in other countries.
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In that sense, questioning the role of an evanescent middle class is misleading. What needs to be 
assessed is the flow of three different economic rents: oil rent in its different forms, nonoil rent 
that is transnational (and mostly intra-Arab) and has deep capitalist entanglements in the national 
economies of countries that are part of the “Arab Spring”, and the bureaucratic degeneration linked 
to foreign aid. This last aspect can be connected to a critique of institutionalised or NGO-ised civ-
il society, which might be seen as having a detrimental role in terms of class formation. Indeed, 
NGOs all too often focus solely on their economic and institutional survival, and reproduce a middle 
class that is disconnected, paradoxically, from the lower classes and popular aspirations they are 
supposed to help and represent through social work.52 This is not to say that civil society organisa-
tions did not play a role in maintaining a space for criticism, even in an authoritarian context.53 But 
part of civil society became entangled in its own transnational sets of consideration (scrambling 
for funding, international networking, regional visibility, etc.). 
Instead, we should look for motors of the Arab uprisings in the less institutionalised type of ac-
tivism, and in the revolutionary capacity of different groups and classes to come together and to 
act in an immediate, presentist manner. These processes have been termed “desectorialisation”54 
or intersectionality.55 The latter term allows us to reflect on the relevance of regional and exter-
nal factors, such as rent and migration, and how these intersect with internal factors to influence 
the dynamics of various national uprisings. Finally, this term also reminds us that change will only 
come from the combined efforts of both the lower and middle classes, which are distinct from 
the interest of the state bourgeoisie and transnational capitalists in maintaining a truncated social 
contract. Alexander and Bassiouny are correct to underline that the Egyptian military (SCAF) spe-
cifically targeted trade unions and worked to stop lower-class mobilisations since these were the 
groups most vocal in reminding the larger public of the need to enact reforms leading to more just 
economic redistribution as soon as possible.56
To conclude this first qualitative detour on transitions, once should not lose sight of how class 
struggle and demands have been pivotal in sustaining demands for general political change and 
the emergence of a new political system. These demands have allowed for the expansion of citi-
zenship rights, and have emboldened the people’s immediate participation in the protests. But the 
ultimate test of citizenship and reformed political representation, as we will now see, lies in the 
question of violence, its reappropriation and the possibility of it confronting how the past use of vi-
olence by state institutions or the ruling regime had become totally illegitimate. 
III. Representation as the reappropriation of violence
Like class, the study of the place of violence in transition and democracy is not a simple or linear 
story. This is true for politics in the whole world, not just in the Arab Middle East. Classical sociology, 
like that of Norbert Elias, reminds us that lying deep beneath the formal aspect of representation 
and the creation of political institutions is an issue that has always been at the heart of the mod-
ern form of politics, namely the challenge to restrain and channel violence in a constructive and le-
gitimate way.57 The Middle East has a more recent history in confronting this challenge, but it has 
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faced the same hurdles. As seen above, the existence of so many conflicts in the region should not 
be explained through quasi-racist culturalist accounts of an “Arab mind” that understands only vi-
olence.58 Rather, one needs to historicise these conflicts, the origin of political violence, and keep 
the massive external meddling in Arab politics in mind. 
It is even more striking to see that all Arab uprisings have tried to question the dominant use of 
violence. The protesters in 2011 not only confronted their regimes and stated in highly visible and 
creative ways that their use of violence against their own population was no longer acceptable: they 
also offered very concrete and constructive alternatives on how to redress the use of violence in a 
more legitimate and democratic manner. People in 2011 have attempted to take full control of le-
gitimate violence – generating a much deeper form of political transition that is often overlooked. 
Before looking at this revolutionary moment, let us characterise succinctly how violence had be-
come one of the biggest grievances for Arab citizens.
One can benefit from excellent studies on the functioning of violence in pre-2011 Arab politics. 
Wedeen concentrates on Syria while Hibou explains the resilience of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia.59 
Both make compelling arguments about the “force of obedience” that these one-party systems (the 
Ba’ath party in Syria and the RCD in Tunisia) managed to generate, allowing for these regimes to 
remain in power pretty much unchallenged for many decades. Even if these systems never man-
aged to convince their citizens to fully accept the dominant ideology, these systems of repression 
and control relied on an array of mechanisms and indirect institutions that occupied so much space 
that no dissidence could emerge: the over-presence of bureaucracy, the spread of private debt and 
the use of public symbols (statues, posters, etc.) to generate affective commitments to the ruler, 
all served as mechanisms and expedients to remind citizens that authority was everywhere. Most 
of the time, the regime did not have to use sheer force to quell dissent, except in rare moments. It 
could induce people to accept the regime’s authority. 
In Egypt, the state institutions have used much more violent means to crush opposition groups, in 
particular the various Islamist factions. Police brutality, torture, death in custody, degrading pris-
on conditions, and daily humiliation on the streets have become so engrained that the Egyptian 
government came to lose any popular legitimacy it enjoyed. Ismail has documented how in Cairo 
“arbitrary police actions and use of torture in detention [had become in the 2000s] common occur-
rences … Everyday encounters with the state in the urban setting bear the marks of repression and 
neglect on the part of the authorities and resentment on the part of the citizens.”60 
The use of violence has become so frequent that people in Egypt think of the state as a very distant 
entity or set of institutions whose function was solely that of protecting the interests of the Mubar-
ak regime. Through her interviews, Ismail offers a bleak statement on the relation between living 
together, in the same state, and violence: “The citizens are aware that the state is not legal and that 
it is repressive but weak. However, fear structures their relations to its agents and their practic-
es.”61 Elsewhere, people from informal neighbourhoods in Cairo stated that: “there is no state, we 
are not in a state. This is a group of thieves, a gang. The interior ministry protects the system, the 
regime … There is nation, but no state.”62
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These three authors help us realise the intimidating power that security bodies (the interior min-
istry, in charge of the mukhabarat, or political police) had until 2011. But the last sentence hints at 
the belief that a collective fate, that of belonging to the same “nation”, remained nonetheless in the 
mind of many Arab citizens. 
The revolutionary potential – or rather the truly democratic element of transition (the demos tak-
ing power) – resides in the possibility of stripping the incumbent power of the capacity to appear 
as the ultimate justification for violence. This would be a return to Weber’s actual definition of the 
state, namely as the human community that holds the legitimate means of violence.63 In countries 
where these imbalances have been laid bare by the immanent power of the people to resist as a 
whole, or through the defection of certain armed groups (especially in Tunisia and Yemen), and 
where representation was organised in a structured way, there has been a demand by the people 
to renegotiate the source of legitimate violence and to give to the human community the opportu-
nity to become the actor in charge of violence. 
The people could have never got their symbolic foot in the door of the management of violence, so to 
say, without the actual defection of certain groups holding security prerogatives. One can even main-
tain that a necessary condition for the revolutionary transition in Arab countries characterised by a 
high degree of militarism and militarisation is the systemic defection of one armed or security group, 
which in turn, can be seen as a result of a process of questioning the legitimacy of their use of violence. 
Indeed, the Tunisian army decided on 13 January 2011 not to use violence against its people, leaving 
Ben Ali with the limited support of his political police, which was an effective tool in repressing long-
term dissidence but unable to quell mass protests such as those that erupted in mid-January 2011.64 
Similarly, in Yemen, the defection in March 2011 of General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar presented a thorn in 
the side of Saleh’s efforts to maintain power.65 In Libya, it is doubtful that without Nato’s air strikes, Qa-
ddhafi would have been toppled. This analysis does not represent a justification for military intervention 
there (or elsewhere), but is an observation that bombings happened and created new situations and 
dynamics on the ground. The Libyan people used this opportunity to reorganise power at a local level. 
It has proved a much more daunting task to do the same trick at national level, where the three his-
toric provinces of Libya are engaged in a struggle over the allocation of resources, such as the oil rent. 
Does it mean that state-making is done through war-making, as Tilly argued nearly 40 years ago? 
And that war-making shapes the structures of state revenue?66 After all the underreported strikes 
in Libyan oil fields and refineries, combined with the problem of turning former militia groups from 
the 2011 civil war into a regular army or state officials, is a classical issue of historical sociology. 
For months during the summer of 2013, oil refinery workers went on strike to force a more equal 
redistribution of oil revenue across the various parts of the country. Similarly, former members 
of irregular armed groups who fought during the 2011 civil war asked to be included in the reg-
ular army. If the Libyan elites and parliamentary groups manage to find a compromise over the 
distribution of resources in 2015, they will have paved the way towards a more meaningful and 
participatory form of state throughout the country. In other words, they have to enact a more just 
connection between revenue extraction and the exercise of violence. It has been a long and diffi-
cult process in Europe and the turn taken in Libya, Yemen or even Syria since the emergence of 
the Islamic State group are terrible reminders of this reality. 
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But there was another significant and more positive break in early 2011. People actively pursued 
a strategy of questioning, at times even visually, how violence had been used against the people. 
In Egypt, people organised a media campaign called al-kadhibun (“the liars”) to confront the lies 
of the regime.67 One key example were the pictures of the death of Khaled Sa’id, a young Alexan-
drian who was beaten to death by policemen in June 2010 for having posted on the internet proof 
of the corruption of Egyptian police. The shocking images of his disfigured body circulated widely 
on a Facebook page called “We are all Khaled Said” and which received hundreds of thousands of 
“likes”, Sa’id later turned into a symbol for the youth who sought revenge on Mubarak and his cro-
nies: for example, a graffito made in February 2011 depicted a frail and tiny Mubarak being held in 
the arms of a giant and resurrected Sa’id, who had returned to his co-citizens to seek justice for all 
the violence committed by Mubarak’s regime on its own population. 
This was a moment where the former guardians were again guarded by the Egyptian people. Thus, 
rather than the aporia of quis custodes ispos custodiet? (who will guard the guardians?), the demos 
(here made explicit by the use of Sa’id’s image as a symbol for the ills and humiliations that Egyp-
tians experienced for years) expressed a clear and potentially revolutionary message: custodes ipsi 
custodiantur a populo, the guardians themselves are now being guarded by the people. The reason 
why this reversal, albeit short, was possible was not simply because of the sheer number of people 
flocking to central squares. It was also engendered by the convergence of different groups, social 
backgrounds, sexes and age groups, which I have termed “intersectionality” above. It was precise-
ly this degree of convergence and impossibility to distinguish which groups were protesting that 
was unsettling for the regime, for they had no means to drive a wedge between different groups. 
Conclusion
This article has argued that radical new paths of doing politics emerged in the Arab worlds with 
the 2011 uprisings. Studies of “transition” must not only concentrate on formal changes in terms of 
political representation, parties, elections, or changes in constitutional texts. Historically informed 
studies of transition in the Arab worlds also need to look at the informal alliances generated in the 
name of class and at how the issue of violence has been partially reappropriated by protestors. 
Repression against the most vocal critics of economic inequality has been a privileged way for the 
military in Egypt to break the revolutionary dynamic. The most revolutionary dimension of these 
revolts, in terms of offering an alternative foundation for a new social contract and shared sense 
of citizenship, has evolved around the attempts to reclaim violence in a just and legitimate man-
ner. Legitimate violence can only exist if it is controlled, at least in part, by the sovereign people 
(democracy is about the power of the demos, tempered by various institutions accounting for each 
other’s actions and functions). 
This revolutionary claim on a shared control of violence has raised citizens’ expectations very high, 
a demand that certain regimes managed to deflect into another round of ruthless violence. Syria, 
Libya and now Yemen have fallen prey to the blindness of certain leaders who are happy to revert 
to old patterns of war-making to cling to power. In other instances, such as Tunisia, informal coa-
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litions have managed to harness these destructive forces and introduce substantial reforms in the 
field of security. The peculiar history of Egypt, where the military as an institution is entrusted with 
vast economic power68 and given the connections of Gulf investors with the country,69 is a reminder 
that a comparative study of political transition cannot exist without a clear understanding of the eco-
nomic forces at play and their origins in at least three decades of forced neoliberal policies. Alex-
ander and Bassiouny are right when they state that “military capital as a distinct form of state cap-
ital in Egypt is a product of the period of neoliberal reforms” and that the violence expressed by the 
military in the last three years has specifically targeted trade unions and other actors, often from 
lower classes, who denounced these economic privileges. To this assessment of who has paid a 
high price since the counterrevolution, one must also include groups that have directly questioned 
the unjust and illegitimate use of violence by Arab regimes. 
To take a step back from the Arab uprisings and to compare them with other revolutionary mo-
ments in the twentieth century, or what Kornetis describes as “contentious politics”,70 the material 
analysed in this article suggests that direct comparisons with 1968 or 1989 events are difficult. For 
one, the Arab Middle East is a region characterised by a higher degree of open domestic and regional 
violence than Europe, one of the main geographic focuses of transition studies in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The concentration of ruthless violence in the hands of socially isolated ruling 
elites in Syria, Egypt or Yemen has no parallels in European history (the Cold War in Europe, and the 
shadows of the two superpowers limited the concentration of the means of violence in the hands of 
national elites). Turning to class politics, while it was possible to identify clear-cut politics in 1968,71 
this became harder after these events. As suggested above, this trend of blurred class lines is also 
identifiable in Arab politics, with the additional complication of accelerated transnational class for-
mation there. But the main difference between 2011, on the one hand, and 1968 and 1989 moments 
of “contentious politics”, on the other, is that the prospect for the economic inclusion of or for eco-
nomic redistribution to large social segments hardly existed in the Arab Middle East of 2011. Hopes 
of receiving a share of the pie because of a moment of full economic expansion (as was the case 
in the 1960s), or to become part of a shared (western) European market and community (as was 
the case for southern, central and eastern European countries after 1989) does not exist at all for 
Arab countries. There are no large regional or economic incentives towards peaceful and econom-
ic integration for Arab countries, which could help shoulder gradual reforms. Revolution, there-
fore, seems the only way to make demands for disenfranchised and disgruntled Arab populations. 
In general, I have argued that the Arab uprisings have had global success because they posited a 
central link between the failure of formal representation and ongoing economic and social deg-
radation, a condition also found in the USA or in Europe. Formal political representation remains 
important, especially in the Arab region, which is characterised by a culture of fear, a lack of plu-
ralism and the absence of a political party system. Yet, the overinvestment or overfocus of much 
of the transitology literature on procedural solutions has proved insufficient for a renewal of social 
theory informed by Arab events. 
Representation has been rethought as a more qualitative process in which the people tried to take 
control and shape a different course as regards the use of violence and generate a deeper form of 
political transition. Two ways to make an intelligent use of the revolts as a source for theory-mak-
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ing is to assess the qualitative shift of political representation since 2011 and its interlocking with 
violence. In the name of the revolution, citizens expressed the modern form of reflexive power of 
the people and of its sovereign power. Such revolutionary aspirations from below were too threat-
ening to be allowed to be implemented. Yet, this alternative path to democratic consolidation de-
serves our full attention in the future.
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